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ABSTRAK
Orang Jawa merupakan mayoritas dari penduduk Indonesia. Secara geografis mereka tinggal di Jawa Tengah, 
DIY dan Jawa Timur. Namun sejak awal abad ke-20 pemerintah kolonial Belanda mulai memindahkan mereka ke 
Lampung di Sumatera bagian selatan dan kemudian ke berbagai tempat lain.Selama seabad Lampung menjadi 
daerah tujuan utama migrasi Orang Jawa, menjadikan Lampung “provinsi Jawa” setelah Jawa Tengah, DIY dan 
Jawa Timur.Berbeda dengan Orang Cina yang berhasil membangun bangsa dan negara Cina, Orang Jawa gagal 
dalam membangun bangsa Jawa; bahkan mendukung dibangunnya bangsa dan negara Indonesia. Dalam tulisan 
ini Orang Jawa di Lampung dilihat sebagai kasus bagaimana kejawaan sebagai sebuah identitas ditempatkan 
dalam konteks perubahan politik pasca-Suharto, ketika desentralisasi dan otonomi daerah mulai dimplementasikan. 
Dari pengamatan yang dilakukan terlihat bahwa Orang Jawa meskipun tetap mempertahankan  sebagian besar 
identitas kebudayaannya namun terbukti tidak menggunakan identitas tersebut untuk melakukan mobilitas politik, 
misalnya pada saat pemilihan kepala daerah. Orang Jawa sudah merasa aman, dan tidak merasa sebagai Orang 
Asing,  karena nerupakan mayoritas meskipun berada di wilayah yang sejatinya milik Orang Lampung.
Kata kunci: Migrasi, Identitas Etnis, Penduduk Lokal, Mobilitas Politik
ABSTRACT
Javanese is the majority of the Indonesian population. Geographically they are resided in the provinces of Central 
Java, DIY and East Java. However, since the beginning of the 20th century the Dutch colonial government began 
to relocate them to Lampung in the sothern part of Sumatra and then to other places. Within a century Lampung 
become the main destination of Javanese migration, making Lampung the “Javanese province” after Central Java, 
DIY and East Java. Unlike the Chinese that is able to construct Chinese nation and state, the Javanese failed in 
constructing the Javanese nation, instead supporting the construction of Indonesian nation and state. In this article 
the Javanese in Lampung is exposed as the showcase of how Javaneseness as an identity is located within the post-
Suharto’s political development contexts, when decentralization and regional autonomy began to be implemented. 
Based on a fieldwork in Lampung, it shows that the Javanese while continue preserving the cultural identities yet 
reluctantly using their identities for political mobilization, for instance during the election of head of local gov-
ernment. The Javanese seems secure to be the majority, and not perceived themselves as strangers, although the 
resided in the land of the Lampuners.
Keyword: Migration, Ethnic Identity, Local People, Political Mobility
“The Javanese continue to be the Javanese but modified by the Sumatran environment.”
(Wertheim, 1959)
1  This paper is originally prepared for 2013 SIEAS Research Cluster Conference, Southeast Asia vis a vis Estrangers in the Historical Per-
spective, Sogang University, Seoul, 31 October- 1 November 2013.
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INTRODUCTION 
Indonesia is well known as a country that 
consists of more than three hundred large and 
small ethnic groups. What is also unique is its 
geographic contour; an archipelago consists of 
various ethnic groups residing on widespread 
islands. The Javanese is the largest ethnic group 
constituting approximately 40% of Indonesian 
population many of which live in Java island. 
Considering the declining of Javanese people’s 
welfare, and a perception of an unbalance 
distribution between Java and other islands; the 
Dutch colonial government shipped the Javanese 
to other islands. Lampung was firstly the first 
destination in 1905. Ever since then, the Javanese 
have slowly turned Lampung into another Java, 
outside Java, as the policy to relocate people 
is continued by the Indonesian government. 
Moreover, many Javanese subsequently decided 
to move to Lampung voluntarily since there 
are both an abundant supply of land and well 
established Javanese communities many of which 
causing the newcomers feel at home.
Nevertheless, beneath the appearance of a 
smooth and peaceful migratory process, tensions 
and conflicts frequently happened between the 
migrants and the native communities. Luckily, 
the authoritarian and repressive nature of both 
colonial and post colonial governments are 
able to suppress the local disputes. In the last 
probably ten years, following the fall of unjust 
Suharto administration, the situation changes as 
the new decentralization policy is introduced by 
the new democratic government that has granted 
autonomy to the district level governments. In 
the last five years, the governors and the district 
heads have been elected directly by the people. 
As expected, the local populations reasserted 
their local identities and mobilize their claims as 
the sons of the soil (putra daerah), demanding 
the right to govern their territories. The Javanese 
who have become the dominant ethnic group in 
Lampung have adjusted themselves to the new 
social and political settings. The resurgence of 
political identities which is brought by the so 
called Lampungers; has a political intention 
viz., evoking an emotional tension between the 
Javanese people vis a vis the native inhabitants. 
Yet it is interesting to note that the Javanese 
individuals seem unaffected by such politicking 
and apparently not interested in the politics of 
identity.
This paper, written as the result of a 
fieldwork in Lampung in 2011 and the study 
of some relevant literatures, aims to provide 
an explanation of why the Javanese people do 
not seem facing significant problems by being 
settlers in Lampung. In contrast to such focus, 
the question of whether or not the Javanese 
are locals is irrelevant to this particular article. 
Divided into five parts, this article, right after the 
introduction, describes the historical development 
of the general Javanese people within the context 
of Indonesian patriotism in the second part of 
this article. Moreover, the third part explores the 
process of Javanese migration and the resistance 
of local communities to their encroachment in 
Lampung. Next, the fourth part strives to fill 
the gap between what some literatures have 
claimed and the social realities be found during 
the fieldwork especially with regard to the recent 
implementation of decentralization. Finally, 
concluding remarks are provided in the fifth part.
DISTINGUISHING JAVANESE 
FROM CHINESE INDONESIANS 
(TIONGHOA)
Who are the actual Javanese that we are 
talking about? In Indonesia, at least, when people 
in every day conversation talk about the Javanese, 
it is assumed that we (Indonesians) know what 
we mean by the term. There is something similar 
in our minds while thinking about the Javanese. 
It is perhaps something similar when we (all of 
us) consider the Chinese. The Chinese, at the 
global level and the Javanese at the Indonesian 
level postulate a similar situation viz., their 
number is huge and their presence overwhelms 
us. Allen Chun (1966) a Taiwanese expert in 
Chinese studies, in a mocking article entitled 
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“Fuck Chinese: On the Ambiguities of Ethnicity 
as Culture as Identity”, compels the following 
sentences:
“It is said that China is the oldest extant 
civilization in the world and that its 
population constitutes one-quarter of 
humanity. Something so well entrenched 
demographically, territorially, politically, 
and historically should be anything but an 
uncertain entity. It is easy, thus, to identify 
something called “Chinese culture and 
society.” Its political presence in the modern 
world system is incontestable, and the 
amount of intellectual discourse devoted to 
the study of China continues to fill libraries. 
In short, there is much to suggest that the 
very idea of China is an unambiguous 
or unquestionable entity. But what is so 
unambiguous about China that makes it 
an unquestioned object of gazing? What is 
the nature of Chineseness, and who are the 
Chinese? Finally, who is really speaking 
here?”
Chun then shows how diverse the meaning 
of China and Chineseness are:
“While the Western term for China appears 
to accentuate the unity of a civilization 
brought about by the Ch’in Empire, Chinese 
terms for China and Chinese, on the other 
hand, suggest other kinds of associations, 
some of which are historically or regionally 
specific. The term chung-kuo, China’s 
rendition of itself as “the middle kingdom,” 
has existed since antiquity, and the term 
chung-kuojen is commonly used nowadays 
to denote Chinese people who speak chung-
kuo hua or some form of Chinese language. 
When Chinese wish to talk about themselves 
as a unified people belonging to a unified 
culture, however, they refer to themselves as 
“people of the Han (dynasty)” (han-jen), as 
belonging to a Han culture that originated 
in the region of the Han River. The process 
of sinicization is one of being Han-ized 
(han-hua), and the ethnic minorities within 
territorial China are likewise set apart 
as being non-Han. Southern Chinese, in 
contrast, typically those from Fukien and 
Kwangtung who constitute the vast majority 
of “overseas Chinese” in places such as 
Southeast Asia, express their Chineseness 
by saying that they are “people of the 
T’ang (dynasty)” (t’ang-jen) who speak 
“T’ang language” (t’ang-hua) and have 
deep attachments toward a homeland called 
“the land of T’ang” (t’ang-shan). Perhaps 
not coincidentally, Chinatown is called 
“street of the T’ang people” (t’ang-jen 
chieh). Nonetheless, the historical metaphor 
cannot be carried too far. When speakers 
refer to t’ang-shan, it usually means the 
China of one’s home village and not that 
of the imperial court; likewise, t’ang-hua 
simply means “Chinese,” which, because it 
can refer to any Chinese, does not sit well 
with Mandarin speakers who claim to speak 
chung-wen.”
The Javanese are definitely not as 
overwhelming as the Chinese yet we could 
discover some similarities between them. The 
Javanese people, like the Chinese, are indeed 
not a single entity as they are diverse in terms of 
geography, history, language, economy, politics. 
Indeed, in the Java island itself, we easily find 
many blatant differences among the Javanese 
identities, such as between the central and the 
peripheral identities, between the coastal and 
the mountainous identities, and between the 
western and the eastern parts. We could imagine, 
therefore, such diversity would spread out as 
the Javanese people, like the Chinese at the 
global level, move and migrate to other places 
either within or beyond Indonesia. No wonder 
then that we find Pujakesuma (the acronym of 
Putera Jawa kelahiran Sumatra or the Sumatran 
Javanese), the Suriname Javanese, and Japung 
(the abbreviation of Jawa Lampung/Lampungnese 
Java). Recently, I visited the Netherlands where 
I met a Javanese who was born in Suriname, the 
Dutch colony in South Africa, where we know 
the Dutch coercively sent Javanese laborers in 
the 1920s and 1930s to unjustly work in various 
sugar plantations. This Javanese-Suriname person 
proudly told me about himself, “Suriname is my 
home, Holland is my country and Java is my soul”.
In the contexts of Java and the Javanese-
ness, Clifford Geertz (1960,7) noted in the 
beginning of his book The Religion of Java:
“Java – which has been civilized longer than 
England; which over a period of more than 
fifteen hundred years has seen Indians, Arabs, 
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Chinese, Portuguese, and Dutch come and go; 
and which has today one of the world’s densest 
populations, highest development of the arts, 
and most intensive agricultures – is not easily 
characterized under a single label or easily 
pictured in terms of a dominant theme. It is 
particularly true that in describing the religion of 
such a complex civilization as the Javanese any 
simple unitary view is certain to be inadequate; 
and so I have tried in the following pages to show 
how much variation in ritual, contrast in belief, 
and conflict in values lie concealed behind the 
simple statement that Java is more than 90 per 
cent Moslem. If I have chosen, consequently, to 
accent the religious diversity in contemporary 
Java – my intention has not been to deny the 
underlying religious unity of its people or, beyond 
them, of the Indonesian people, generally, but to 
bring home the reality of the complexity, depth, 
and richness of their spiritual life.”
Having discussed the Javanese identities, 
perhaps it is appropriate to say that the Javanese 
people, like the Chinese share both a singular and 
a plural identities.
THE UNMAKING OF JAVANESE 
NATION
Javanese and Chinese people are likely to 
ignite controversies not because they share various 
cultures but their continual, constructed and 
reconstructed identities pave the way to frictions. 
If there are differences between the Chinese and 
the Javanese it may presumably be related to the 
notion that China does not only refer to a nation 
but also a state. In contrast, there is no such thing 
called the Javanese nation nor the Javanese state. 
As a consequence of such notion, we are aware of 
the existence of what is called Chinese citizens, 
but none of whom are called the Javanese citizens. 
In the Chinese particular context, we also notice 
the rivalry between the ROC (Taiwan) and the 
PRC the extent to which both are contesting for 
political legitimacy and authenticity as being the 
legitimate heirs of Chinese culture. 
From the Indonesian history we learn that the 
idea of Javaneseness loses its political legitimacy 
right after the founding fathers, many of which 
comprised of the cross, ethnic, educated elites, 
vowed on 28 October 1928 in Batavia declaring 
that they are: ”one nation, one language and one 
country” that is called Indonesia. Ever since then, 
such idea of Javaneseness merely indicates a 
group of people that are more or less united by a 
similar language, traditions and customs, arts and 
cultural heritages. All those characteristics more 
or less signify what perhaps could be defined as 
the Javanese culture. Java as indicated by the 
culture is always in the making process but Java 
as a political identity is unfortunately shrinking. In 
the Javanese studies, perhaps Benedict Anderson 
(1972) is the one and only expert who elaborates 
eloquently what he calls as ”the idea of power in 
Javanese culture”. Meanwhile, John Pemberton 
(1994) scrutinizes the idea of reinvention of Java 
in his book On the Subject of Java.
 To compare with the Chinese experience, 
Sun Yat Sen and Mao Tse Tung constructed a 
Chinese patriotism that needed to be based on 
culture, but Sukarno and Hatta ground their 
thoughts on the modern idea of nation which 
is based on civic instead of ethno-nationalism. 
Indonesian nationalism earned its legitimacy 
from the national struggle against colonialism 
and the shared experiences and ideals of what 
Anderson describes as the imagined community 
(2003). Moreover, Indonesian nationalism is 
not defined by the glories of the past but by 
the common goals on the future. Indonesia is a 
common political project that should be realized 
by the common efforts of all ethnic groups. The 
construction of nationhood is indeed influenced 
by the way nationalism is crafted. The state as 
the embodiment of the nation often requires a 
kind of national identity. National symbols in the 
forms of arts, languages, architectures and food 
are inevitably necessary as the characteristics of 
national identity and nationhood. In this regard 
it is interesting to remember that a nation always 
consists of different ethnicities that possess their 
own ethnic characteristics. In the case of China, 
despite the fact that the Han is the largest and 
most dominant ethnic group, there are minorities 
that also possess their ethnic identities. Such 
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a situation poses a problem as Allen Chun 
concludes:
“The existence of ethnic minorities within China’s 
national borders, on the other hand, created 
particular problems for reconciling notions of 
ethnicity in relation to national identity. For the 
most part, the government adopted a Stalinist 
policy of multiculturalism, with the Han ethnic 
majority positioned at the core of a family of 
nations.”
Ethnically speaking, Indonesia is probably 
more diverse than China although the Javanese, 
like the Han ethnic, could be regarded as the major 
ethnic group. The Javanese people, however, do 
not have the luxury to claim as the core of a family 
of nations as the Han in China does. On the one 
hand, the Han is deliberately constructed by the 
state as the core nation. On the other hand, the 
Javanese have never been so well constructed. 
The construction of the Han as the core nation, 
however, implies some consequences as shown 
by Allen Chun:
“The criteria of traditional practices and 
material customs applied to distinguish ethnic 
groups, however, made the very notion of ethnic 
identity within a cultural taxonomy problematic, 
especially in cases of historically known minority 
groups that had been undergoing a long process 
of sinicization. In this regard, the need to define 
ethnicity according to the kind of hard-and-fast 
rules characteristic of the boundedness of a 
modern nation-state ultimately fabricated ethnic 
divisions that did not exist in the minds and 
lives of the people themselves, while at the same 
time made cultural objectification a normative 
practice in the state’s institutional routine. As 
in the case of Taiwan, history and ethnicity 
thus combined to produce (a national) identity 
in which they were, in fact, nothing more than 
imagined constructions by the state to define the 
ethos of its own modernity.”
A long process of sinicization as experienced 
by minority groups in China also occurred in 
Indonesia, culminating during the reign of Suharto 
military government from the 1970s to the 1990s. 
The process of Javanization had already become 
a contentious issue in the 1950s at the time when 
the national government began advocating the 
transmigration programs as a policy to assimilate 
the local populations into the so called national 
identity. Heeren (1979) and Wertheim (1986) 
observed the implementation of this policy in 
Lampung and Sumatra Selatan provinces. The 
national government created some enclaves of 
Javanese resettlements in the middle of Lampung 
communities. In the Suharto’s administration 
the transmigration program is intensified by the 
support from the World Bank both for controlling 
the population density in Java, and for supporting 
what they called as regional development. 
The ultimate goal of relocating the Javanese 
through transmigration programs was, however, 
ideological: to achieve the national integration 
(Tirtosudarmo, 2001). 
The policy has been widely criticized 
because it implies both marginalizing the minority 
groups, and deforestation in order to open a new 
land. It is no secret that the timber companies take 
benefits from the transmigration program.  On 
the pretext of strengthening national integration 
the transmigration program is also used in order 
to reinforce the strategic interests of military 
forces in several areas, perceived by the national 
government as a kind of fortified bastion against 
the separatist movements such  as in Aceh, 
Papua and East Timor. Despite all controversies 
concerning the security system of transmigration 
program during the Suharto administration, it is 
still relevant to ask whether or not the durable 
process of Javanization in Lampung as the 
oldest place for relocating the Javanese, and as 
a result the province is by now demographically 
dominated by the Javanese; did come into reality.
Given that Java has essentially failed to be 
the basis for constructing a Javanese nation, in 
another paper (Tirtosudarmo, 2005, 14-15) I have 
explained the reason for such failures:
“The explanation as to why the Javanese 
failed to assert their political identity should 
be sought in the history of nationalism in 
Indonesia which began to emerge in the dawn 
of the twentieth century. The first generation of 
Javanese intellectuals that were the product of 
the Dutch educational system began to imagine 
what sort of future political community would 
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suit the indigenous people in the archipelago. 
Here I would like to cite the debate between 
two Javanese intellectuals, namely Tjipto 
Mangoenkoesomo - who advocated Indies 
nationalism - and Soetatmo Soeryokoesomo 
- who advocated Javanese nationalism. This 
debate – in Dutch not Javanese or Malay – 
took place in 1918, the same year in which the 
Volksraad (People’s Council) was founded by 
the Dutch (see Shiraishi, 1981). In this debate, 
Soetatmo advocated Javanese nationalism, 
arguing that the nation could and should be built 
on the basis of common culture and language. 
Javanese nationalism had its basis in the common 
culture, language and history of the Javanese, 
whereas the cultural bases of Indies nationalism 
were nonexistent or, at best, a product of Dutch 
colonial rule. Javanese nationalism was the 
means of self-expression for the Javanese, 
while the Indies nationalism was no more than 
a reaction to Dutch colonial domination of the 
Indies. Therefore, he (Soetatmo) argued, only 
Javanese nationalism had the sound cultural 
basis on which the Javanese could establish 
their future political community. In reaction 
to this argument of Soetatmo, Tjipto defended 
Indies nationalism. In his opinion, what was 
totally lacking in Soetatmo’s view was world 
historical development. He argued that Europe 
was clearly more advanced than Asia, and 
therefore the Javanese could learn from the 
European historical experience the direction in 
which the national formation in the Indies would 
go. The Indies were indeed composed of diverse 
ethnic groups, with each ethnic group having a 
different culture and language, but Java had lost 
its sovereignty and was only a part of the Dutch-
dominated Indies. The fatherland of the Javanese 
was no longer Java but the Indies, and the task 
of the national leaders was to work for Indies 
nationalism. In the end, after a long process of 
negotiation and conflicts, Indies nationalism 
more or less prevailed as the new form of 
‘Indonesian nationalism.’ Yet, Javanese-ness 
did not fade away, but instead contributed – in 
some instances through elite manipulation and 
reinvention of Java - to contemporary Indonesian 
politics” (Pemberton 1994). 
Like China, Indonesia also faces some 
difficulties in the construction of national identity. 
National identity as perceived by the power 
holders is required by what they define as the 
national culture. But what is national culture? 
The constitution defines it as the peaks of all 
regional or local cultures. If this is the case, the 
next question is how do we opt the regional or 
local cultures that ultimately represent the national 
culture?
JAVANESE MIGRATION AND THE 
LAMPUNGERS’ RESISTANCE
The Javanese diaspora has existed since 
the earliest times as Hugo (1980) notes “A good 
example is the Javanese movement into the 
Banten and north coastal regions of Sundanese 
West Java which gaining its momentum in the 
sixteenth century …”.  Furthermore, he argues 
that:
“This movement was instrumental in the 
spread of sedentary wet rice cultivation into 
West Java where previously almost all of the 
indigenous Sundanese population engaged 
in ladang (dry field) cultivation.” 
The presence of Javanese people in Sunda 
and Banten has become in turn the source of 
migration to Lampung.1 According to the late 
Indonesian maritime historian, Adri Lapian, 
the Sunda Strait is geographically decisive in 
determining the interaction between people in 
both Banten and Lampung. Thereby, discussing 
Lampung should be necessarily complemented 
with Banten according to Lapian.2 
In 1905 the unjust Dutch colonial 
government began to relocate people from Java 
to Lampung. Under the so called Ethical Policy, 
relocating people (land colonization) was one 
out of three related programs, with the other two 
are education and irrigation. Through the land 
colonization program, 155 Javanese families 
from Bagelen, Kedu areas in Central Java, 
are resettled to Gedong Tataan in Lampung, 
Southern Sumatra Selatan3. The motivation of 
1  There are at least two theories about the place of origin of 
people in Lampung. The first theory holds that their ancestors 
came from Banten in the western part of Java while in contrast 
the second explains that the origin of the people in Lampung is 
Pagar Ruyung in Sumatra Barat. 
2   Personal communication in May 2011 with A.B. Lapian in Ja-
karta.
3  Gedong Tataan is located at the foot of Mt Betung, about 20 
km west of Tanjung Karang (Bandar lampung). At the time Ge-
dong Tataan became a subdistrict of the district of Pasawaran, 
Bagelen became the name of a village in the Subdistrict Gedong 
Tataan. 
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the Dutch is not merely the demography and 
economy based reasons but also due to security 
reasons. The Javanese countryside in the 19th 
and early 20th centuries are characterized by  the 
sporadic social unrest, and the peasant rebellious 
movements against the Dutch unjust, repressive, 
agricultural policies (Kartodirdjo 1973). Not only 
did sporadic, the peasants’ unrests and violent 
conflicts occurred almost on the entire Javanese 
rural areas between 1900-1920 in Tangerang, 
Pamanukan, Sukabumi, Ciasem, Kuningan 
(Jawa Barat), Pekalongan, Gombong, Semarang 
(Jawa Tengah), Mojokerto, Sidoardjo, Kediri and 
Jember (Jawa Timur), (ANRI, 1981). There might 
be a direct linkage of the Javanese rural unrest 
and land colonization in Sumatra although it is 
inconceivable that such a coincidence could posit 
a causal relationship. 
The perception that land colonization is not 
only driven by some demographic reasons but 
also aimed to be a kind of social experimentation 
is also conveyed by ORSTROM (1980) in their 
report:
“Lampung’s destiny has been a prodigious 
one. Devoid of human inhabitants up to the 
end of the 19th century, this southernmost tip of 
Sumatra was to become, in the 20th, the privileged 
experimental zone for all the forms of organized 
colonization ever elaborated in the framework 
of the Dutch kolonisatie or the Transmigration 
program of independent Indonesia. The voluntary 
development policies were so successful there 
that today the government has been forced to 
take preventive measures in order to protect 
the natural environment and to rely upon the 
local offices of the Transmigration Ministry to 
encourage emigration to the other islands in the 
archipelago.” 
The Dutch land colonization program 
that is perceived by ORSTROM as a social 
experimentation experienced several changes 
since its beginning in 1905 until the Javanese 
arrival in 1942, (ORSTOM, 1986, 83-87). 
Heijting, the architect of land colonization 
program, says that: “Javanese emigration can 
only be successful by establishing ‘little Java’ in 
Lampung”.4 The conceptual idea on which the 
4   Kingston (1990).
land colonization program is based – known as 
the “Javanese paradigm” – in principle is aimed 
to create a Javanese rural community in Lampung. 
The Javanese are relocated into an area that is 
considered by the Dutch as an empty land in the 
middle of local communities in Lampung as noted 
by Kingston (1990): 
“In recreating the Javanese landscape, the 
government allotted about 1.5 bouw (1 bouw= 
0.709 ha.) of land per family and encouraged 
wet rice cultivation by subsidizing irrigation. The 
government intended that the pioneer settlements 
engage in food production and did not encourage 
export commodity crop production; the Dutch 
image of what Javanese villages ought to be like 
overshadowed what they could be like.  It was 
the ideal type of Javanese village, conveyed by 
the village elite and embraced by the colonial 
officials that defined the manner in which 
transmigration was implemented on the ground.”
Heeren (1979) argues that the reason for 
Heijting to relocate the Javanese in an area that 
is separated from the local communities was not 
primarily to make the Javanese people feel at home 
but due to the resistance from local communities 
in handing over their land to the Dutch unjust 
colonial government. Separating the Javanese 
communities from the local population, however, 
implied criticism from Nitisastro (1955: 125, as 
quoted in Heeren 1979, 17) by which such policy 
reflects the enclaved politics. Widjojo Nitisastro 
is of the opinion that the Javanese should be able 
to assimilate with the local population since both 
communities are Indonesian citizens. Based on his 
observation in 1956 in Lampung, Wertheim (1956) 
finds that assimilation between the Javanese and 
the local population occurred in practice but it 
did not turn the Javanese into Sumatran people 
or Indonesians, but rather be more Javanese with 
some adjustments to the Sumatran environment. 
Kampto Utomo (1974) notes that until 
1928 the resettlement pattern of the Javanese 
indeed followed the enclaved politics where 
the Javanese are engineered to form their own 
local governance.5 Until the marga system is 
5  Kampto Utomo’s study in  Lampung was the basis for his PhD 
thesis at Bogor Institute of Agriculture where Professor W.F. 
Wertheim was his  supervisor. 
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revived by the Dutch as “inlandse gemeente,” 
the Javanese communities are governed under 
the marga system. The Javanese communities 
spread out very fast ranged from Gedong Tataan 
to the west, and occupying places such as 
Pagelaran, and to the south encroaching the areas 
surrounding Rawa Kementara. In the western 
part, starting from Pringsewu (1926) that later on 
transform into a Javanese concentration, and to 
the north encroaching areas of Way Sekampung. 
The encroachment of Javanese in Lampung 
practically halted during the Japanese occupation 
but resumed immediately after the Japanese 
left (1942), and the recognition of Indonesian 
sovereignty by the Dutch in 1949. According to 
Kampto Utomo (1974) the reason for resuming the 
land encroachment by the Javanese in Lampung 
was primarily due to the communication and 
interaction between themselves with their relatives 
in Java run smoothly as people visited one another 
or sent letters that eventually encouraging the 
unstoppable, voluntary transmigration. 
The waves of Javanese resettlement in 
Lampung, as Wertheim observed in 1956, 
eventually created some social tensions with 
the local population in which case the land 
competition inevitably increased:
“This situation leads to an increasing resistance 
of Sumatrans to the way in which resettlement has 
been carried on. Such resistance may seriously 
hamper further transmigration efforts. Thus it 
can be stated that the absorptive capacity of the 
outer islands is not only restricted by spatial and 
technical but also by social factors as well.”
Who are actually the local communities in 
Lampung resisting such Javanese encroachment? 
Referring to the definition used in the 2000 
Population Census, those are: Orang Peminggir 
(6.42%), Orang Pepadun (4.22%) and Orang 
Abung Bunga Mayang (1.28%) Suryadinata 
et.al., (2003: 18).)  In their research on the 
local communities in Lampung, ORSTROM 
(1986: 91) identifies at least four groups: Orang 
Abung, Orang Menggala Tulang Bawang, Orang 
Pubian and Orang Pesisir. The migrant groups 
originating from South Sumatra, as identified by 
ORSTROM are: Orang Ogan, Orang Sumendo, 
Orang Way Kanan and Orang Mesuji. In relation 
to the Javanese settlers, these people could be 
categorized as the local population or simply 
called Orang Lampung or the Lampungers.
Wertheim’s observation in 1956 is relevant 
to the wider political context after the Dutch 
left Indonesia. After the independence, the 
administrative system at the local level began 
to change in 1950 following the rapid change 
in the political system at the national level. The 
change in the land ownership system (previously 
organized through the adat (customary) laws 
but then the national laws) is one of the sources 
of dissatisfaction among the local population. 
The reorganization of marga (from the local 
government hierarchical structure into the 
new autonomous institution called negeri) 
also triggered social tensions. The negeri 
comprises several marga including the Javanese 
communities that reside into the respective areas.
(Heeren, 1979). According to the national laws, 
a negeri should be created based on democratic 
principles rather than by the customary laws. 
Therefore, a Javanese could be the head of a 
negeri insofar as he/she is elected democratically.
The various changes related to the new 
arrangement concerning local governance caused 
local grievances against the national government. 
Both the regional rebellion in Sumatra Barat, 
Sulawesi Selatan and Sulawesi Utara under the 
banner of PRRI/Permesta in 1956-1958 paved 
the way for local populations in Lampung to 
articulate their feelings through a petition to stop 
the transmigration program which is launched 
in the Adat Conference, firstly in Palembang 
(January 1956) and then in Bukittinggi (March 
1957).6 In response to the threatening political 
situation in 1959, President Sukarno, supported 
by the military forces, announced a decree to 
return to the 1945 Constitution, and arbitrarily 
dissolved the Konstituante that was preparing a 
6  According to Heeren (1979: 50) the abolition of 
transmigration program was also one of the de-
mands of PRRI/Permesta.
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new constitution. Under this administration, the 
negeri and the marga systems are abolished as 
well, and all local administrative arrangements 
are organized by the district governments.
As the regional rebellions finally reduced the 
frequent resistance of local population in Lampung 
against the Javanese settler, transmigration is also 
practically halted due to the budget constraint 
of national government. Indeed, the program is 
stopped due to the arbitrary change of power 
from Sukarno to Suharto following the 1965 
national political tragedy. In the 1970s, the 
transmigration program re-implemented under 
Suharto’s New Order regime in which Lampung 
was one of the major transmigration destination 
areas.7 Here, the nationalization project of local 
government is reshaped by the Law No. 4, 1974 
concerning the regional level government, and 
the Law No. 5, 1979 concerning the village level 
government. The uniformity process of local 
government throughout Indonesia proceeded 
almost without any significant resistance from the 
local population as Suharto arbitrarily appointed 
military officers to be both the district heads and 
the provincial governors.8 
THE JAVANESE IN LAMPUNG AFTER 
THE NEW ORDER
 The step down of Suharto, a Javanese, 
from power in May 1988 is described by a 
foreign observer as the end of the ‘Last Sultan’ in 
Indonesia  (Loveard, 1999). Nonetheless, Suharto 
who held almost absolute power for more than 
thirty years is not considered as the Last Javanese 
King. Although Suharto’s style of government is 
strongly associated with the Javanese political 
culture (Pemberton, 1994), only the Yogyakarta’s 
Sultan is popularly known as the Javanese King. 
7  The following is the national number of families moved under 
transmigration programs and the percentage. Repelita I (1969-
1974): 11397 KK (29%), Repelita II (1974-1979): 4500 KK 
(8%), Repelita III (1979-1984): 42876 KK (12%), Repelita IV: 
1984-1989: 17893 KK (9%), Repelita V (1989-1994): 12515 
(5%), Repelita VI (1994-1997): 8412 (4%).  Tirtosudarmo 
(2001: 212).
8  In Lampung from 1973 to 1998 the governors are always a Ja-
vanese military general: Sutiyoso (1973-1978), Yasir Hadibroto 
(1978-1988) and Pedjono Pranyoto (1988-1998).
The collapse of Suharto’s authoritarian political 
regime is perceived as the end of a centralist 
government that emphasized too much uniformity 
in the arrangement of local government. It is 
therefore quite understandable that one of the 
immediate demands in the aftermath of Suharto 
regime should be for political decentralization and 
regional autonomy.
 Several new regional laws and regulations 
are created to support the implementation of a 
decentralization policy to open up the political 
space for the local populations to articulate their 
wishes. Under the new political space local 
populations began to mobilize their local identities 
to reclaim what they conceived as their local 
rights. Adat or customary laws, that are totally 
repressed under Suharto administration, revived 
by now. The local populations reclaimed their land 
ownership and organized their right to have their 
own local government and leaders based on the 
adat laws. In Lampung, local intellectuals actively 
reinvent their traditions in order to provide the 
justifications for their political claims such as 
the sons of the soil (putra daerah). They have 
reinvented traditions – to borrow Hobsbawm’s 
terminology – through several projects such as 
rewriting the history of Lampung, reviving local 
customs, and teaching the Lampung language. 
Such activities, however, have implied limited 
impacts and are still in the early stages. 
 Migration of the Javanese to Lampung 
has occurred for more than a century so that 
Lampung has become demographically and 
culturally a kind of Javanese province outside 
Java. In many places such as  Pringsewu and 
Metro for example, Javanese has become the 
lingua franca. In this regard the question put 
forward in the title of this paper ”The Javanese....
locals or strangers?”, seems to be relevant here. 
As the ORSTROM (1986) study has shown the 
majority of Javanese in Lampung comprises 
the second, the third even the fourth Javanese 
generations. These”Javanese-Lampung” as they 
are called do not even know where their Javanese 
ancestors originally came from. The Javanese have 
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dominated various positions and occupations, 
within the government offices, in the universities 
and local parliaments, as well as in the private 
sectors. As the position of the governors and the 
district heads are now contested through direct 
elections, the Javanese should be quantitatively 
the winners if they politically exploit their ethnic 
identities to win the elections. In contrast to such 
political configuration, the Lampungers would not 
mathematically vanquish the Javanese in elections 
though they could exploit their claim as the sons 
of the soil.
 The new electoral system allowing the 
direct election of local leaders paves the way 
for the local population to mobilize their local 
identities to influence the election processes. In 
such a situation Lampung provides an interesting 
case as the majority of its population is Javanese 
and the local population is a minority. In the 
last gubernatorial election, the candidates used 
cultural symbols to attract votes. Interestingly, 
the Javanese candidates are lost to the local 
Lampunger candidate. This reality could be 
interpreted as that the Javanese voters – that is 
the majority – apparently are not attracted to the 
Javanese candidate, and in fact they chose the 
local candidate as their governor. How can we 
explain this phenomenon?
 According to Wertheim’s (1959) 
observations on Lampung in 1956 says, the 
Javanese identity developed not according to the 
expectations of the designers of land colonization 
or transmigration program. Both the designer who 
wanted the Javanese to retain their Javanesness 
by engineering the enclaved politics, and other 
designers who expected the Javanese to be the 
agents of assimilation to create an Indonesia-
ness in Lampung; should have disappointed 
by the reality as the Javanese maintain their 
Javanese-ness but be modified into the Sumatran 
environment to some extent. To be consistent 
with Wertheim’s study, the Javanese in Lampung 
turn out to be the ”Jawa-Lampung” or ”Japung”. 
This new identity of Javanese-Lampungers is a 
result of more than a century of Javanese cultural 
transplantation into the Lampung environment. 
Indeed, the Javanese identity in Lampung is 
so much different from the Javanese in Solo or 
Yogyakarta the Javanese on the northern coast 
of Java or the Javanese in Suriname or New 
Caledonia.
The political participation of the Javanese 
in Lampung as reflected by their decision to vote 
for the local candidate instead of the Javanese 
candidates; indicates their pragmatism in their 
daily lives. For the Javanese it is not important 
what the ethnic identity of the candidate is insofar 
as he or she is perceived as a capable leader 
to foster peace and welfare to the society. The 
current euphoria in many communities to create 
a new district in Lampung for instance is also not 
a big deal for the Javanese as they might think 
that whatever happens, they are the majority in 
anyway. 
CONCLUSION
Javanesness, unlike Chineseness, has not 
turn into a political identity. Some attempts done 
by a few Javanese elite groups to form a Javanese 
nationalism are proven to be unsuccessful because 
Indonesian leaders deliberately developed a civic 
instead of an ethnic based nationalism (ethno-
nationalism). The Javanese have submitted their 
ethnic identity in favor of the trans-ethnic and 
national identity though they are demographically 
the dominant ethnic group in Indonesia. In other 
words, Javanesness transformed into merely a 
social and cultural identity rather than political 
identities. In the era of the post-Suharto political 
decentralization, as the case in Lampung has 
shown, the Javanese seem not to be interested 
in mobilizing their ethnic identity as it has been 
excessively taken for granted by many other 
ethnic groups in Indonesia. 
Apart from the historical fact that the 
Javanese have relegated the idea of Javanese 
nationalism, in reality, they have already gained 
some economic and political important positions 
in Lampung. Their votes are always decisive to 
the local election results. In Lampung, the issue 
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of ethnicity is an elite issue while in contrast 
laymen, either Javanese or non-Javanese, pay no 
attention to such topic. Tradition is exercised by 
the local elites because they foresee some political 
opportunities provided by the new political 
developments in the post Suharto administration. 
The discourse of Lampungers as the sons of the 
soil (putra daerah) has increased in the last ten 
years, and indeed there is a common question to 
the Javanese,”how should they respond to such 
increasing politics of identity in Lampung?” 
Based on my short fieldwork in Lampung, I have 
come to several arguably premises regarding the 
main questions put forward in the title of this 
paper, ”The Javanese in Lampung: Strangers or 
Locals?” 
 Firstly, the Javanese in Lampung are 
not really concerned about their ethnic identity. 
Secondly, if tensions and conflict occur in 
such a way, the source is not really ethnicity 
but rather the rivalry over various economic 
resources especially the land ownership. Thirdly, 
Javanesness apparently could not be mobilized for 
supporting the politics of identity in Lampung. 
Fourthly, the Javanese and Javanesness are 
certainly not static and homogeneous but diverse 
and constantly shifting in response to the changing 
environment. Fifthly, the Javanese in Lampung 
have created a new identity viz., the”Javanese-
Lampung” or”Japung;” that could be considered 
as the local identity. Yet, such thing is no longer 
relevant because they are somehow regarded as 
strangers. 
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